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THREE ESSAYS ON THE DYNAMICS OF OIL PRICES

Ahmed Alaabodi, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2020

The main objective of my three essays is to study the dynamics and interaction of the
price of oil with the downstream sector (refined products), upstream sector (oil production), and
across regional markets. I shed light on how the new technological innovation of horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracking that caused the shale oil revolution in the last decade impact the
price of oil and impact the petroleum market in the United States.
In the first essay, the dynamic relationship between the monthly price of crude oil and its
refined products is modeled. The long-run equilibrium carries valuable information for risk
management and forecasting in the oil industry. The benchmark for the crude oil in this study is
West Texas Intermediate (WTI), and the refined products are motor gasoline and No. 2 distillate
(residential heating oil and diesel fuel). A test is conducted to detect the structural breaks in the
long-run equilibrium due to several disruptions in the petroleum market globally. Structural
breaks are found in July 2004 and March 2011. The structural break identified in July 2004 may
be attributed to the surge in crude oil demand from China, while the other structural break may
be explained by the shale oil boom. The test for price leadership in the oil market shows that the
price of crude oil is weakly exogenous.
The second essay analyzes the relationship between tight oil production and the price of
crude oil in an asymmetric environment in order to investigate the asymmetry in the long and
short run. Evidence of asymmetry is found in the relationship between the price of WTI and total

expected production from tight oil plays in the long run. This result implies that the United States
is the marginal producer. The asymmetric behavior in the long run may be attributed to contracts
hedging, geography legal obligation, and productivity of the tight oil plays. The tight oil
production by play is disaggregated in order to examine if the asymmetric relationship on the
plays level. These plays are Austin Chalk, Bakken, Bone Spring, Eagle Ford, Mississippi,
Niobrara, Permian, Wolfcamp, and Woodford. While there is evidence that the asymmetric
relationship does exist among the majority of the tight oil, no such evidence for the asymmetric
relationship in the short run is found.
The third essay examines the time-varying volatility spillovers across the major crude oil
benchmarks: WTI, Brent, and Dubai. Studying the time-varying spillovers is a crucial factor
impacting the volatility of the price of oil. The dynamic conditional correlation is employed to
investigate the contemporaneous correlation across global oil markets. There is evidence of
strong correlation between the benchmarks of WTI and Dubai that may be attributed to
integration in the Asian markets. There is a low correlation between WTI and Brent and Brent
and Dubai. However, the correlation significantly increases at times of uncertainty in the global
economy, especially in 2019. That uncertainty is characterized by the increased trade tensions
between the United States and China. The elevated tensions in trade bring uncertainty to the
energy sector. I extend the analysis using the connectedness measure to examine the timevarying connectedness for a longer time horizon using the rolling window approach. The
findings can be summarized as follows: The benchmark of WTI is net transmitter, Brent is net
receiver, and Dubai fluctuates between net receiver and transmitter. The results from the
connectedness measures support the dynamic conditional correlation results that the comovement increases at the time of global shocks.
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CHAPTER I
LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM IN THE UNITED STATES REFINING MARGIN IN THE
PRESENCE OF STRUCTURAL BREAKS

1.1 Introduction

This study aims to model the dynamics of the petroleum market in the United States by
examining the short-run and long-run fluctuations that influence the crude oil and refined
products, gasoline, and heating oil markets. Modelling the equilibrium relationship in the
refining margin (the price relationship between the crude oil and the refined products) is
important. The long-run equilibrium carries significant information for integrated oil companies
that are involved in the upstream (oil production) and downstream (oil refining). The price risk
depends on fluctuations in the price of crude oil and derivatives, which provide a great deal of
insight into risk management and managing an oil assets portfolio. Furthermore, the long-run
equilibrium conveys valuable information about the future changes of the refining margin and
price leadership in the petroleum market. When the price relationship between crude oil and
refined products is modelled in the long-run equilibrium framework, it can be utilized for
hedging and forecasting. This is based on the fact that the prices of the crude oil and refined
products move together, and any fluctuations in the prices move back toward a long-run
equilibrium price relationship.
Modelling the cointegration relationship of the refining margin is not an easy task. The
petroleum market encountered several fluctuations and disruptions globally over the last three
decades due to geopolitics, natural disasters, and financial crises. For example, the geopolitics of
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the oil-rich region of the Middle East, where 80% of proven oil reserves exist, have caused
turbulence in the crude oil market. In 1986, during the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) collapse, OPEC members significantly increased crude oil production; the
price of crude oil dropped by 50%.The Gulf Crisis in 1990 doubled the price of crude oil within
two months in anticipation of a decreased supply of crude oil and fear of spillover effects on
Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer in the world. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 caused
a 9% decrease in global oil production (Hamilton, 2011). In early 2003 during the Gulf War II,
around 4.3 million barrels were eliminated from global production because of the crisis in the
Middle East and political instability in Venezuela (Hamilton, 2011; Kilian, 2008; Murat and
Tokat, 2009). Political uncertainty in the Middle East results in spikes in the price of crude oil
due to the expectation of supply cuts. Natural disasters in the Gulf of Mexico, such as Hurricane
Katrina in 2005, cause disturbances to the petroleum market in the United States because 50% of
refining operations are along shorelines in the states of Louisiana and Texas (Hayes, 2009).
Financial crises such as the Great Recession of 2007-2009 increase uncertainty about the demand
of crude oil. The price of crude oil dropped 70% within the third quarter of 2008 (Hamilton
2011, Kurita 2009). Geopolitics, natural disasters, and financial crises have all been proven to
affect the stability of the crude oil market.
The demand for crude oil and technological innovation play a vital role in the petroleum
market in the long run. According to Kilian (2008), the oil market following the year 2000 is
more of a demand-driven market. The surge of crude oil demand from the emerging economies
in Asia, especially China, has a long-run impact on the petroleum market globally. Even though
the price of crude oil was rising after 2003, the demand increased as well. The reason for this
increase in demand was the Chinese economy’s ability to weather the increase in energy prices;

2

that was partly attributed to fuel subsidies. According to the International Energy Agency (World
Energy Outlook, 2010), the emerging economies in Asia were expected to shape the global
energy demand for the future.
In late 2008, the shale oil boom took place through a new technological innovation
utilizing horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. This innovation significantly changed the
petroleum market globally. It reduced the dependence of the United States, the largest consumer
of crude oil in the world, on supply from the OPEC countries. This had a major impact on the
downstream of the oil industry (refining operations) due to the United States transitioning from a
refined product importer to exporter. Unlike conventional crude oil, which has a spectrum from
heavy sour to light sweet (depending on the sulfur continent and the light product portions), the
tight oil produced in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking is considered a light sweet oil.
The lighter the crude oil, the larger the portion of the light and middle distillates (gasoline and
heating oil), and the cheaper to process. Furthermore, the major change in production ensures
that refineries buy more of the shale oil due to the price of the new, unconventional source being
lower than the world price of crude oil. The refineries continue to process the tight oil at a lower
cost.
This study conducts a more thorough analysis of the possibility of structural break in the
cointegration space through a comprehensive set of diagnostics. Following Hansen and Johansen
(1999), the parameter constancy in the cointegrating vector autoregression VAR model is
utilized to test for structural stability in the short-run and long-run dynamics. In order to
determine the timing of the structural breaks, it is useful to use the Bai-Perron (2003) test
because it exactly identifies when the structural break happens. Another crucial issue to
investigate is the weak exogeneity in the system. Exogeneity means that one variable influences
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another variable, but this relationship does not exist in reverse, and the exogenous variable is
determined outside the system. In this context of the price relationship between crude oil and
refined products, it is important to study exogeneity because it conveys valuable information
about price leadership in the petroleum market.
Hansen and Johansen (1999) show that the model is not structurally stable, despite the
inclusion of distinct events such as Gulf War I and II, Hurricane Katrina, and the Great
Recession. This study contributes to the literature by investigating structural breaks in the
cointegration space. The Bai-Perron test shows that there are two structural breaks, in 2004 and
2011. It is likely that these structural breaks are due to the surge of demand from the emerging
economies in Asia, especially China, and innovative technology (horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracking). The weak exogeneity test shows that the price of crude oil is weakly
exogenous, thus crude oil is the price leader in the US market.
The paper is organized as follows: Section two outlines the framework and theory of this
study, section three is a description for the data, section four shows the econometric results and
discussion, and the final section is the conclusion.

1.2 Econometric Modelling

The dynamics between the price of crude oil and the price of refined products is analyzed
𝑔

using a cointegrated vector autoregression (CVAR) model. Let 𝑝𝑡 = (𝑝𝑡𝑐 , 𝑝𝑡 , 𝑝𝑡ℎ ) be a 3 x 1
vector that contains the log of the spot prices of crude oil, gasoline, and heating oil. The log
prices are assumed to be integrated of order 1 and generated by
∆𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽 ′ 𝑝𝑡−1 + ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝛤𝑖 ∆𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛼𝛿 ′ 𝑑𝑙𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑑𝑠𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑑𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡
∗
= 𝛼𝛽 ∗′ 𝑝𝑡−1
+ ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝛤𝑖 ∆𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜑𝑑𝑠𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑑𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 ,
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where 𝑝𝑡∗ = (𝑝𝑡′ , 1, 𝑑𝑙𝑟,𝑡 ) and 𝛽 ∗ = (𝛽 ′ , 𝛿 ′ ). The vector 𝑑𝑙𝑟,𝑡 contains a set of dummy variables
that allow structural breaks in the long-run equilibrium in the refining margin. This vector is
assumed to enter the cointegrating space. The columns of the matrix 𝛽 ∗ contain the r
∗
cointegrating vectors, which are such that 𝛽 ∗′ 𝑝𝑡−1
~ 𝐼(0). The 3 x r matrix 𝛼 contains the

parameters that determine rate at which prices move towards the long-run refining margin. The
vector 𝑑𝑠𝑟,𝑡 contains a set of dummy variables to represent abnormal shocks to crude and refined
product prices that affect only the short-run dynamics. The prices of crude and refined products
are known to have a strong seasonal component due to seasonal variation in both demand and
supply. The model includes a set of twelve seasonal dummies, 𝑑𝑠𝑟,𝑡 , to represent this seasonal
variation. The error vector 𝜖𝑡 is assumed to be independent and identically distributed as a
multivariate normal.
The Johansen procedure is based on an unrestricted vector autoregression model error
correction model. This framework is appropriate in the sense that it provides and describes
detailed information about the petroleum market structure. The Johansen procedure models the
short-run and long-run dynamics. The model is
∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽 ′ 𝑃𝑡−1 + ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝛤𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + ∅𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡 ,

(1)

where 𝑃𝑡 is the vector that includes the price of crude oil, the price of gasoline, and the price of
heating oil that I examine for the long-run relationship (the vector of I(1) variables). The first
step is to test for the cointegration rank using a likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis is rank
(𝛱 )= 0. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the VAR system is stationary. The matrix 𝛱 is a
reduced form matrix 𝛱 = 𝛼𝛽 ′ , where the weight matrix 𝛼 (𝑁𝑋𝑟), where N is the number of the
variables in the system and r is the number of cointegrating vectors or the equilibrium error,
contains the coefficients of the variables in the vector 𝑃𝑡 adjusted for the long-run dynamics.
5

This means the higher the value of the coefficient in the 𝛼 matrix, the faster the variable adjusts
to the long-run dynamics. The matrix 𝛽 (𝑁𝑋𝑟) contains the cointegrating parameters. The error
term 𝜀𝑡 is assumed to be normal as well as independent and identically distributed. Thus, the
process 𝛽𝑃𝑡−𝑖 is a stationary process that is adjusted to the long-run equilibrium. The speed of
adjustment is according to the coefficients of the weight matrix 𝛼.
In order to test for parameters’ constancy, I apply a recursive estimation by Hansen and
Johansen (1999) and Juselius (2006) in which I use a likelihood function to recursively estimate
the eigenvalues over the sample period and represent them graphically. In this paper, I focus on
three main tests: the log-likelihood, fluctuation, and trace tests. In the log-likelihood test I
compute and test the recursive log-likelihood function. In both tests the null hypothesis is that the
parameters are constant and in both X and R forms. The X form represents the model with shortrun dynamics, while R represents the concentrated form.
𝑅0𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽 ′ 𝑅1𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(2)

To test for long-run weak exogeneity, the matrix of loading coefficients 𝜶 is utilized by
imposing restrictions. It is important to test for weak exogeneity because it carries more
information about price leadership in the market (does the crude oil or the refined products drive
the petroleum market, which is different from the industrial organization context); in other
words, there is no level feedback. I can test this hypothesis using the likelihood ratio test after
imposing a restriction matrix. The hypothesis is to test a specific includes zero row.
𝛼1
)
0

𝐻0 ∶ 𝛼 = 𝐻𝛼1 = (

(3)

Thus, if both coefficients are different from zero, there is a causality in both directions. On the
other hand, if only one of the coefficients is zero, there will only be a one-way causality. With
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only a one-way causality, there will not be long-run causality in the system of variables; the
weak exogeneity exists and the variable is the price leader.

1.3 Data

The data consists of monthly observations of the spot prices of crude oil, gasoline, and
heating oil. I use the time frame from January 1986 - June 2018. West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
is used as the benchmark for the crude oil. The gasoline prices are defined as the average price of
US motor gasoline, and the heating oil is defined as distillate fuel oil No. 2. The price for
gasoline and heating oil is US$/gallon, while the crude oil price is US$/barrel (spot prices). The
data collected is from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The analysis is done
with prices in logarithms.

1.4 Econometric Results and Discussion

The price series in figures 1.1-1.3 show the monthly time series plots for the price of crude oil,
gasoline, and heating oil in the natural logarithm form. The upper panel is the level and the lower
𝑔

panel is the first differences. The time series for 𝑝𝑡𝑐 , 𝑝𝑡 , 𝑝𝑡ℎ looks non-stationary in levels and the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test in table 1.1 confirms that there is no mean reversion.
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Figure 1.1. Monthly log price of crude oil in levels and first differences.

Figure 1.2. Monthly log price of gasoline in levels and first differences.
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Figure 1.3. Monthly log price of heating oil in levels and first differences

Table 1.1
Descriptive Statistics for the Levels and First Differences of Log Prices
skewness
Kurtosis
𝑆
𝑋̅
𝑝𝑡𝑐
𝑔
𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡ℎ
𝛥𝑝𝑡𝑐
𝑔
𝛥𝑝𝑡
𝛥𝑝𝑡ℎ

3.551
0.106
0.308
0.115
0.003
0.013

0.659
0.595
0.681
0.426
0.016
0.11

0.312
0.318
0.321
-1.314
-1.402
-1.409

1.707
1.652
1.639
10.155
11.912
10.361

ADF
-1.840
-1.886
-1.589
-12.624
-14.120
-13.302

Note: Critical values for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test are; -3.449, -2.869, -2.570 at 1%, 5%, 10%.

There is a level shift between 2002- 2008 in the upper panel of figures 1.1-1.3. It also appears
𝑔

that the 𝑝𝑡𝑐 , 𝑝𝑡 , 𝑝𝑡ℎ are cointegrated. The lower panel of figures 1.1-1.3, showing first differences,
shows that the series have mean zero, implying that there is not any trending behavior; appear to
be stationary. Furthermore, there are abnormal shocks around late 1990 and 2008 in the lower
panel of figure 1.1-1.3.
𝑔

The analysis starts with a general unrestricted VAR model for 𝑝𝑡𝑐 , 𝑝𝑡 , 𝑝𝑡ℎ . Based on the
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), the lag order was 2. However, the lag order of the
unrestricted VAR model is defined as 4, based on the LaGrange Multiplier test, in order to
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whiten the noise from the VAR residuals. Time series plots of the VAR(4) residual showed a
seasonality in both autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function. Seasonal
dummies were added to the VAR model to attempt to correct for seasonality, as shown in figure
1.4.

Figure 1.4. Residuals of the unrestricted VAR(4) after correction for seasonality. Residuals from
the price of crude oil equation (top panel), residuals from the price of gasoline equation (middle
panel), and the residuals from the price of heating oil equation (bottom panel).

The residual autocorrelation for the unrestricted VAR(4) shows abnormal shocks around 1990
and between 2002-2008. Table 1.2 shows the residual analysis for this VAR(4) model. I utilize
the Lagrange Multiplier test to calculate the residual autocorrelation at the ith lag. The null
hypothesis is that three autocorrelations and six cross-correlations are zero at the specific lag. As
10

shown in table 1.2, LM(2) and LM(4) are insignificant, while LM(6) is significant. The JarqueBera test highly rejects normality in the VAR(4). Juselius (2006) states that the VAR model
estimates are robust against non-normality.

Table 1.2
Specification Tests for the Unrestricted VAR Model
Autocorrelation test χ2 (9)
P-value
LM(2)
7.007
0.156
LM(4)
11.493
0.11
LM(6)
10.879
0.055
Normality test

χ2 (6)
122.087

0.000

Before testing for cointegration, I tested the structural stability of the VAR model using
the recursive log-likelihood, trace, and fluctuation tests. Figures 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 display the time
line of eigenvalues trace test (log-likelihood, trace test, fluctuation tests) derived from the
VAR(4) system; the eigenvalues are recursively calculated. These tests use the time path of the
estimating eigenvalues as a diagnostic tool to evaluate the structural stability of the model. The
log-likelihood, trace, and fluctuation tests are calculated for the baseline sample 1986:012000:12. All the tests are at a 5% level of significance and the critical values are scaled to 1. The
log-likelihood test in figure 1.5 shows the recursive estimation for the model in both the X-form
(the full form) and the R-form (the concentrated form).
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Figure 1.5. The recursive log-likelihood function fluctuation test for the VAR(4) model.

The log-likelihood test for the model shows that the cointegration relations are not structurally
stable in both the X-form and the R-form. There are several fluctuations around 2003-2006
(these periods coincide with the Second Gulf War and Hurricane Katrina). Moreover, there is
another fluctuation around 2008. The instability in the X-form seems to be bigger than the Rform. Figure 1.6 shows the recursive trace test in two forms: the X-form—the full form (upper
panel)—and the R-form—the concentrated form (lower panel).
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Figure 1.6. The recursive trace test for the VAR(4) model.

The test statistics for each additional value are divided by the critical value. If this fraction is less
than the unity, then the cointegration relationship exists. Both the X-form and R-form models
show that the cointegration relationship exists in the refining margin and the trace test for r = 2.
The cointegration relationship looks linear overtime, and stable, with some fluctuation around
2008, the time of the Great Recession. More insight into the cointegration relationship can be
found in figure 1.7.

Figure 1.7. The recursive eigenvalue fluctuation test with shift dummy for the VAR(4).
13

The fluctuation test shows the structural stability for the individual cointegration. It seems that
the first cointegration relationship is structurally stable for both the X-form and the R-form.
There is a fluctuation between 2008-2009, but it is not significant. The second cointegration
relationship is not structurally stable. The graph for the second cointegration relationship shows
significant fluctuations between 2007-2009, the time of the Great Recession, for both the X-form
and the R-form, which means the second cointegration relationship rejects stability. Juselius
(2006) states that the rejection of the fluctuation test is a “strong signal for parameter nonconstancy.
In order to identify the timing of the structural breaks in the second cointegration
relationship, the Bai-Perron test is implemented here. Bai-Perron (2003), hereafter referred to as
BP, requires a stationary time series. BP is a structural break test that identifies the break date
where both the sum squared of residuals and the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) agree to
minimize. The null hypothesis for this test is k versus a k+1 structural break. Instead of the prior
assumption of the break date, the BP test allows us to endogenously identify more than one break
in the long-run equilibrium. Therefore, the BP test is appropriate in this study. Figure 1.8 shows
the number of break points versus BIC and the residual sum of squares. According to the BP test,
the number of breaks corresponds to the point where there is a minimization consensus between
the residual sum of squares (RSS) and BIC.
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Figure 1.8. The number of breaks and the corresponding BIC and RSS.

In figure 1.8 the RSS is minimized at two breakpoints and both RSS and BIC curves diverge for
the breakpoints 3, 4, and 5. The 95% confidence intervals of the breakpoints are identified; for
July 2004 the 95% confidence interval is (February 2003-October 2005), and for March 2011 the
confidence interval is (July 2010-October 2011), as shown in figure 1.9.
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Figure 1.9. Equilibrium error for the breaks and the confidence intervals of the structural breaks.

The confidence interval is not symmetric; however, it is consistent with Perron (2005), as the
series properties are not identical before and after the breakpoint. The structural break in the
cointegrating relationship is represented as dummy variable [0,0,0,1,1,1,1] inside the
cointegration space, as shown in Equation 1. The critical values at this point are computed
according to Nielsen (2004), since the shift dummy in the cointegration relations impacts the
asymptotic distribution. The first shift in level is in July 2004. The shift dummy is coded as 1 for
the time spans July 2004-June 2018, and 0 otherwise. The second shift in level is identified in
March 2011. Accordingly, the dummy variable is coded as 1 for the time window March 2011June 2018 and 0 otherwise.
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Furthermore, a different set of dummies are used to correct for the structural stability that
influences the short-run dynamics. Transitory “blip” dummy is for the temporary disturbances in
the energy market in the United States, such as Category 3 Hurricanes that hit the Gulf Coast.
Several hurricanes have been included: Andrew, Ivan, Katrina, Gustav, Issac, Bret, and Harvey.
Only Hurricane Katrina is found to be significant in the model. The dummy variable here is
coded as 1 at the time of the hurricane (August 2005), -1 for the following month (September
2005), and 0 otherwise. The transitory shock does not persist for a long period of time and is
more of a short-run phenomena. Although there was damage to the oil industry in both the
upstream (oil production facilities) and downstream (refining operations) along the Gulf of
Mexico, the shortfall was compensated for by eleven million barrels of crude oil and refined
products released from the Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) to mitigate the impact of
Hurricane Katrina (Difiglio, 2014).
Transitory shock dummy is for global disturbances in the petroleum market, such as the
OPEC collapse in 1986, the Gulf Crises in 1991 and 2003, and the Great Recession in 20072009. This transitory shock is more persistent than the shock caused by natural disasters. The
influence of the shock does not vanish in the subsequent period. The transitory shock for the
OPEC collapse dummy is coded 1 for the months of September and October 1986 and 0
otherwise. The first Gulf War dummy is coded 1 for the months of August and September 1990
and 0 otherwise. The second Gulf War dummy is coded 1 for the months of March and April
2003 and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable for the Great Recession is coded 1 for the fourth
quarter of 2008 (October, November, and December 2008) and 0 otherwise. According to
Hamilton (2011), the price of crude oil experienced a significant downturn in this quarter (it
crashed from $135 to $41 within three months).
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A final examination for the model shows that after correcting for the long-run
equilibrium, I fail to reject the structural stability of the eigenvalues for the trace, log-likelihood,
and fluctuation tests, as shown in figures 1.10, 1.11, and 1.12.

Figure 1.10. The recursive log-likelihood fluctuation test for the final CVAR(4) model.

Figure 1.11. The recursive trace test for the final CVAR(4) model.
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Figure 1.12. The recursive eigenvalue fluctuation test for the final CVAR(4) model.

This implies that there are major events that change the nature of this relationship between the
major energy commodities in the United States. The surge of demand from emerging economies
in Asia and the shale oil revolution have a significant impact on the long-run equilibrium
between crude oil and refined products. The structural breaks of July 2004 and March 2011 in
the final model may be explained as follows:
Beginning in late 2003, refining capacity in China consistently and significantly
increased, from 2.2 million barrels per day in 2004 to 11.2 million barrels per day in 2017. The
growing demand in China of the crude oil and petroleum products put a pressure on the price of
oil internationally. This increase in demand is coming from the growth of output of the industrial
sector as well as the ongoing shift from the rural to urban area. In the meantime, crude oil supply
from OPEC countries slowed down because of the second Gulf War and Saudi Arabia’s use of
the excess supply during the crisis. The mis-match between supply and demand caused a
structural break in the petroleum market in July 2004. This structural break is a long-run,
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because China aimed to build an inventory similar to the United States (Kilian and Hicks, 2013;
Hamilton 2009).
The shale oil boom occurred in late 2008, but it was not until early 2011 that the effects
of technological advances reached the oil market. In 2011, sufficient capacity was available for
pipelines to transport tight oil from the Midwest to Cushing (Oklahoma). Major pipelines
transfer the crude oil to the Gulf Coast, where the refineries are located (Bornstein and Kellog,
2014). Accordingly, tight oil production increased by 287% between 2011 and 2015 (Kilian,
2017). This significant change in the production of tight oil ultimately offered a substitute for
imports from the Middle East and makes the geopolitical disturbances less burdensome. The
innovative technologies that enabled the shale oil boom significantly changed the petroleum
market globally. They reduced the dependence of the United States, the largest consumer of
crude oil in the world, on supply from the OPEC countries. This had a major impact on the
downstream of the oil industry (refining operations) due to the United States transitioning from a
refined product importer to exporter.
As the preliminary analysis suggested, there are two cointegrating vectors, as shown in
table 1.3, which implies that there are two driving trends and one stochastic trend.

Table 1.3
Cointegration Rank
p-r
r
3
2
1

0
1
2

Eig.value

Trace

Frac95

P-value

0.156
0.104
0.019

112.867
48.882
7.249

35.070
20.164
9.142

0.0
0.0
0.117
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The dummies that have been added to correct for the short-run events (OPEC collapse, Gulf War
I, Gulf War II, Hurricane Katrina, and the Great Recession) are all significant, as shown in table
1.4.

Table 1.4
Dummy Variables
Gulf War I
𝑐
0.187
𝛥𝑝𝑡
(3.114)
𝑔
0.122
𝛥𝑝𝑡
(2.435)
0.161
𝛥𝑝𝑡ℎ
(3.120)

OPEC collapse
0.220
(3.663)
0.098
(1.931)
0.123
(2.375)

Katrina
0.056
(-2.726)
0.111
(3.594)
0.073
(2.280)

Gulf War II
-0.101
(-2.726)
-0.054
(-1.764)
-0.068
(-2.122)

Great Recession
0.146
(3.871)
-0.208
(-6.651)
0.138
(-4.268)

Note: Values in parentheses are t-ratio

Table 1.5 shows the eigenvectors, and table 1.6 shows the adjustment coefficients of the weight
matrix for the final model, after accounting for the structural break that causes a shift in the mean
of the long-run equilibrium parameters in the model.

Table 1.5
Estimated Cointegrated Vectors from the Final CVAR Model
𝑔
𝑝𝑡𝑐
𝑝𝑡ℎ
𝑝𝑡
β1
1.590
-20.485
15.702
β2
-17.675
5.982
12.501

D04**

D11*

intercept

0.045
-0.960

-0.030
0.272

0.034

Note: D04 is a shift dummy inside the cointegration space for the structural break in 2004. It takes the value of 1
07/2004 to 06/2018, 0 otherwise. D11 is a shift dummy inside the cointegration space for the structural break in
2011 and has the value of 1 (01/2011-06/2018), 0 otherwise.

Table 1.6
Adjustment Coefficients of the Unrestricted Estimates from the Final CVAR model
α1
α2
𝑐
-0.003
0.006
𝛥𝑝𝑡
(-0.700)
(1.699)
𝑔
0.015
-0.006
𝛥𝑝𝑡
(4.990)
(-1.889)
-0.007
-0.010
𝛥𝑝𝑡ℎ
(-2.341)
(-3.281)
Note: Values in parentheses are t-ratio.
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0.121

In the first cointegration relationship, the sign is different between the 𝛽 and 𝛼 matrix; it is
significant for heating oil. The opposite sign implies the correction toward long-run equilibrium.
However, the sign of the gasoline is similar and significant in the 𝛽 and 𝛼 matrix, which implies
an overshooting behavior. In the second cointegration relationship, the signs are opposite, which
implies the correction toward long-run equilibrium.
Table 1.7 shows the residual analysis for the model, indicating that the model passes the
serial correlation test for LM(2), LM(4), and LM(9).

Table 1.7
Specification Tests for the Unrestricted CVAR Model
Autocorrelation test
χ2 (9)
P-value
LM(2)
7.007
0.362
LM(4)
11.493
0.243
LM(6)
10.879
0.248
Normality test

χ2 (6)
89.861

0.000

The normality test shows that the final model has less skewness and kurtosis, which have
improved; however, it still rejects normality. It is important to determine the cointegration rank
due to the subsequent inference dependence. The exogeneity test gives more information about
price leadership. By testing the weight matrix, the price leader within the petroleum market can
be determined. Table 1.8 shows that the likelihood ratio test for exogeneity is rejected for the
price of gasoline and the price of heating oil (p-value= 0.067 for gasoline, p-value = 0.006 for
heating oil), while it fails to reject weak exogeneity for the price of crude oil (p-value = 0.151).
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Table 1.8
The Exogeneity Test
Variable
𝑝𝑡𝑐
𝑔
𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡ℎ

Test statistic
3.786
5.418
10.299

P-value
0.151
0.067
0.006

This implies that the price of crude oil is the price leader; it is determined outside of the refined
product market. Another implication is that the prices of refined products can be used to forecast
the price of crude oil in the short-run. In the long-run, I need to test for strong exogeneity for the
price of crude oil, which is strongly rejected at p-value=0. This means it is possible to use the
price of refined products to forecast the price of crude oil in the short-run, which is consistent
with the previous literature (e.g. Alquist et al., 2013; Asche et al., 2003; Hendry, 1996).

1.5. Conclusion

This paper provides evidence that the price of gasoline and the price of heating oil are
cointegrated with the price of crude oil in the United States petroleum market, using the
Johansen procedure throughout the sample period (January 1986-June 2018). There are major
events that impacted oil production and refining operations in the US, such as geopolitical events
in the Middle East, including the first and second Gulf Wars, and because of the expectation of
oil supply cuts. Natural disasters in the Gulf Coast, such as Hurricane Katrina, also impact oil
production and refining operations in the US because major refining operations are along the
coastline in the states of Texas and Louisiana. The Great Recession influenced the oil market due
to the slowing in demand for crude oil and the financial crisis.
The Bai-Perron test identifies two structural breaks in the second cointegration
relationship; these are July 2004 and March 2011. The surge of oil demand from emerging
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economies (China) explains the structural instability in the long-run equilibrium and caused the
shift in the mean of the cointegration space in July 2004. The shale oil boom can explain the
second structural break of March 2011. The weak exogeneity test shows that the price of crude
oil is weakly exogenous, and it is the price leader in the US petroleum market.
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CHAPTER II
AN ASYMMETRIC ANALYSIS BETWEEN OIL PRICE AND TIGHT OIL
PRODUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM THE PLAY LEVEL

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the price of crude oil
and the production of shale oil in the United States in an asymmetric, cointegrating environment.
Analyzing the relationship between shale oil produced and oil price is important. The shale oil
boom has left a major impact on oil production over the years. The shale oil boom was caused by
the technological innovation of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking, as stated by Kilian
(2016). As shown in table 2.1, shale oil production increases from 1.009 million barrels per day
in 2011 to 3.494 million barrels per day in 2014.

Table 2.1
US Shale Oil Production in Thousands of Barrels per Day
Location
2011
Total production
1009
Austin Chalk
TX
37
Bakken
ND, MT, SD
308
Bones Spring
NM, TX
31
Eagle Ford
TX
92
Mississippian
OK
19
Niobrara
Co, KS, NE, WY
58
Permian
NM, TX
203
Wolfcamp
NM, TX
47
Woodford
OK
8

2014
3494
33
930
172
1169
87
174
396
159
37

2019
7360
130
1386
590
1201
299
523
1527
1279
96

In 2014, the United States reached 10% of the total global oil produced, according to the Energy
Information Administration (EIA). More than 50% of the total oil production in the United
States is supported by the production of shale oil. The shale oil boom also transformed the world
oil market by changing the direction of trade in crude oil. Sharenow and Worah (2013) argue
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that the combination of shale oil production in the United States and the oil sands in Canada have
brought more balance to the world oil market since the oil crisis in 1973.
There are two major areas of research that analyze the impact of shale oil production.
One strand in the literature studies the effect of shale oil production on the spread of West Texas
Intermediate-Brent (WTI-Brent). Monge, Gil-Alana, and De Gracia (2017) analyze the
relationship between the price of WTI and shale oil production using wavelet methodology and
fractional cointegration approaches. Their research finds a comovement between shale
production and WTI oil price. Caporin, Fontini, and Talebbeydokhti (2018) examine the longrun relationship of WTI-Brent and shale oil production and find that shale oil production caused
a structural change in this relationship over the last few years.
The other area of research studies how shale oil production specifically impacts the price
of WTI. For example, Manescu and Nuno (2015) study the effect of the shale oil boom on oil
prices and economic growth. The authors identify the unanticipated increase in the shale oil
supply as the cause for the decline of oil prices in the second half of 2014. Kilian (2016)
analyzes the effect of the shale oil revolution on the price of crude oil and the price of gasoline.
He explains the effects of the shale oil boom and how it lowers the price of WTI oil due to the
glut of tight oil supply and the refineries’ infrastructure bottlenecks.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first study that examines the asymmetric relationship
between the price of oil and shale oil production. Modelling the relationship between the price of
crude oil and shale oil production is a challenging task. The swinging behavior of the price of oil
is one major component that drives the complexity of this research. Examples of that behavior
include oil supply shocks from OPEC members and the slowing growth rate of the global
economy. These two events caused the oil price shock in the last quarter of 2014. Oil prices
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dropped from $110/barrel to $40/barrel in a few months, according to the EIA This price decline
environment could bring symmetric and asymmetric behavior to the oil price/shale oil production
relationship.
The symmetric behavior effect can be identified when a price increase of oil leads to an
increase in the level of shale oil production. Similarly, a decrease in the price of oil leads to a
decline in the production of shale oil. In the end, the positive and negative components are both
equal in the short run and long run.
The asymmetric effect and nonlinearity have been studied in the oil market. An example
of this nonlinearity is the famous phenomenon of “rocket and feathers.” The Rocket and Feathers
Effect means that prices increase quickly, like a rocket, in response to cost increases, but fall
slowly, like a feather, in response to cost decreases. Rocket and Feathers is intensively studied in
order to capture the effect of asymmetric behavior between the price of crude oil and the price of
gasoline. That is, the price of gasoline rises quickly—like a rocket—in response to positive
shocks in the price of crude oil, but it falls slowly—like a feather—in response to negative
shocks (Bacon, 1991; Galeoti, Lanza and Manera, 2003; Bachameier and Griffin, 2003;
Verlinda, 2008; Tappata 2009; Chou and Tseng, 2016; Eleftheriou, Konstantinos, Nijkamp, and
Polemis, 2019; Kang, Wensheng, De Gracia, and Ratti, 2019).
In this paper, I introduce another source of asymmetry between the price of crude oil and
shale oil production in the United States. The asymmetric model has the advantage of allowing
asymmetries in the short run and long run. There are many reasons for asymmetry in oil price
and shale oil production relationship; one reason is that shale oil producers are marginal
producers. Even though shale oil producers can shut down production quickly, they do not have

30

the sufficient spare capacity or the workforce to bring production back to the original level
within thirty days.
Moreover, Krane and Agerton (2015) explain another source of asymmetry, who explain
the requirements of contracts hedging and legal obligations that have to be met by producing
designated amounts of oil by specific dates. No matter how low the price of oil is, production
will continue in order to meet those legal obligations. Furthermore, the geographical location of
oil fields is another asymmetry source. As shown in table 2.1 (above) and by the map in figure
2.1, shale oil fields exist in different geographical locations.

Figure 2.1. Oil Production in Thousands of Barrels.

For example, the Permian basin, Eagle Ford play, Wolfcamp play, and Austin Chalk play are
located in Texas. The play of Bone Spring is located between Texas and New Mexico. The
Bakken play is located in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana. Niobrara is located in the
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Northeast of Colorado, at the border of Wyoming, Kansas, and Nebraska, and in Woodford,
Oklahoma. Thus proximity to transportation and pipeline infrastructure may reduce the
asymmetric effect. One of the major shale oil plays, Bakken, is located in North Dakota; it took
until 2014 to solve the problem of transportation. As shown in table 2.1 (above), production from
the play of Bakken increased from 0.308 million barrels in 2011 to 0.93 million barrels per day
in 2014.
Productivity in the oil field can also be a cause for the asymmetric effect. The exploration
and drilling activity that has occurred over the last decade is likely due to the discovery of “sweet
spots” in production. The sweet spot is characterized by high production and the ability to remain
profitable even when the price of oil is low; this is because wells drilled in sweet spots produce
4-6 more than other wells in the play and the average cost is $6-$8 per barrel lower than the
average well (WSJ, 2018).
The asymmetric impact in the short run may also come from weather conditions. For
example, during the winter the severe weather conditions in North Dakota slow down production
from the Bakken oil field. This is especially evident during the months of January and February.
These conditions suggest that even when there is a positive shock to the price of oil, the
production does not increase. Furthermore, the asymmetric effect in the short run can be captured
in drilling activity, which is measured by rig counts. The rig count is the determinant parameter
for the present and future production capacity of the oil fields. The rigs freeze during winter
yields and this leads to a decline in shale oil production, as reported by Reuters (2014) and
Genescape (2018).
Krane and Agerton (2015) argue that tight oil producers are the new world “swing
producers”: producers that have a large market share, spare capacity, and low production cost.
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This means that in response to any change in the price of crude oil and the market environment,
shale oil producers can readjust production in the short run. The role of the swing producer
should include cutting back production and then bringing production back to the original level.
Although shale oil producers can cut back production in the short run, they cannot bring back
production rapidly. For example, Saudi Arabia can increase or decrease crude oil production by
one million barrels per day within thirty days. This is different from the “marginal producer.” It
took thirteen months—from March 2015 to March 2016—for six hundred shale oil companies to
increase or decrease around five hundred thousand barrels per day (Till, 2016). This is because
they require a frack crew, the assembling of which is a process that might take a few months;
therefore, they cannot jump-start drilling and producing. A marginal producer acts as a market
stabilizer. The differences between the swing producer and the marginal producer are clarified in
Alhajji (2017). One of these differences is that shale oil producers are affected by the oil prices
make the shale producers “price takers” and accordingly marginal producers.
Another difference is that shale oil producers are unable to move global oil prices by
increasing production. Shale oil producers are affected by oil prices due to the fact that they
operate independently, and not in a collective, monopolistic way. Alhajji (2017) also sets two
other criteria for the swing producer: the quality of the crude oil and the storage capacity. The
swing producer has a storage capacity that can be brought to the production line in one month,
but this not true for tight oil producers because of the lack of activities coordination (Kleinberg,
Palstev, Ebinger, Hobbs, and Boersma, 2018). The quality of the crude oil, in the sense of
specific gravity API (American Petroleum Institute), also matters. The swing producer is
required to provide a range of crude oil quality, on a spectrum from heavy crude oil to ultra-light
crude oil. Again, the light, tight oil does not fit this criterion. Yet shale oil producers cannot act
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as swing producers in the global oil market since they are unable to change the production in line
within one month and cannot influence the world oil price. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is
able to increase production up to 1 million barrels per day within a month.
However, the United States has become the new “marginal producer” (The Economist,
2014). Previously this designation was limited only to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), as they adjusted production to confront geopolitical events, primarily the
supply shocks during the first and second Gulf Wars. The marginal producer acts as a stabilizer
to world oil prices. For example, the rise in the production of shale oil decreased the impact and
demand of the crude oil demand growth rate, as reported by Kleinberg et al. (2018). This change
offset the impact of several geopolitical events, such as the Arab Spring, between 2011-2014.
To investigate the potential asymmetric relationship between the price of oil and shale oil
production, this paper utilizes the asymmetric cointegration approach. In particular, I employ the
Nonlinear Autoregressive Distributing Lags cointegration that was introduced by Shin, Yu, and
Greenwood-Nimmo (2014) to test for asymmetric behavior. I test for cointegration using the
Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) approach, while examining the equality of the long-run
parameters with the Wald test.
I find evidence of asymmetric behavior between shale oil production and the price of oil.
I disaggregate our analysis across eight major oil fields. I repeat the analysis of testing
asymmetry and cointegration. Again, I find evidence that asymmetric behavior and cointegration
do exist across the majority of oil fields. I attribute the asymmetricity to several factors, such as
the geographical location of the tight oil plays, legal obligations of the contractors, hedging on
contracts, and drilling in sweet spots.
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2.2 Background

Similar to conventional oil resources, unconventional oil resources follow a declining
curve. The production from tight oil wells declines exponentially over time at a rate that is
explained by geological characteristics. The rate at which tight oil production declines from time
𝑡0 to time 𝑡1 is called the decline rate. Tight oil production from well 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is a function of
the rate of initial tight oil production 𝑞𝑖0 , decline rate 𝑏, and the number of periods since the well
was drilled 𝑚 and can be written as
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖0 𝑒 −𝑏𝑚 , 𝑏 ∈ (0,1).

(1)

The decline rate in the tight oil production play depends on time since the well 𝑖 achieved
peak production. The well life is characterized by three stages and different decline rates. The
log-linear relationship is given by
ln(𝑞𝑖𝑡 ) = ln(𝑞𝑖0 ) − 𝑏𝑚𝑖 .

(2)

Equation (2) implies that the price elasticity of tight oil production is zero. However, this
implication contradicts the Hotelling Rule (1931), which states that the production rate on a
non-renewable resource is efficient only if the marginal profit increases at the market interest
rate. However, recent literature (Anderson, Kellogg, and Salant 2018; Mason and Roberts 2018;
Mason and Van’t Veld 2013) finds that the incentive to reduce production from a well that is
subjected to a decline in production is small, even if there is a probability of the price of crude
oil rising in the future. Anderson et al. (2018) attribute this to the fact that tight oil cannot be
extracted while the price of crude oil is higher. Tight oil producers respond differently to market
signals. For example, when the price of crude oil increases, tight oil producers respond by
increasing the production rate from existing wells. The producer might respond to a higher price
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of crude oil by drilling in productive prospects that are less profitable at a low crude oil price.
The efficiency gained from drilling over the last decade is likely to be transferred to other tight
oil wells, and the new technologies of fracking and horizontal drilling may result in an overall
reduction in the breakeven cost; therefore, tight oil producers may sustain production in the long
run even in an environment of lower oil prices.
In the literature, it is common to model technological innovation as an increase in the
marginal productivity of capital and labor. In this case, I study technological innovation as a rise
in the productivity of the well. The new technologies of fracking and horizontal drilling in tight
oil production have led to an increase in production and more drilling prospects.

2.3 Econometric Modelling

The objective of this paper is to study the asymmetry in the short and long run of the
price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 𝑃𝑡 . and shale oil production 𝑄𝑡 . The linear error
correction model without asymmetry in the short- and long-run dynamics can be written as
𝑝−1

𝑝−1

∆𝑄𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜌𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑃𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖 ∆𝑄𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜋𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 .
𝑗=1

(3)

𝑗=0

The long-run equilibrium between shale production 𝑄𝑡 and the price of WTI crude 𝑃𝑡 is
𝑄𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡

(4)

where 𝛽 = 𝜃/𝜌. The short-run dynamics of the two series are determined by the 𝛾𝑖′ 𝑠 and the
𝜋𝑖 ’s.
I proceed with one equation estimation because I did not find empirical evidence of
reverse causality in the relationship between tight oil production and the price of WTI. This
reveals a one-way relationship—that is, the price of WTI influences tight oil production.
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Shin et al. (2014) developed a cointegrating nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag
(NARDL) that allows for short- and long-run asymmetries. The model utilizes the decomposition
of the variable 𝑃𝑡 into positive 𝑃𝑡+ and negative 𝑃𝑡− partial sum in order to detect the
asymmetries in the short and long run. The current price of positive and negative deviations in
𝑃𝑡 can be written as
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃0 + 𝑃𝑡+ + 𝑃𝑡− ,

(5)

where 𝑃0 is the initial value, and
𝑃𝑡+ = ∑𝑡𝑗=1 ∆𝑃𝑗+ = ∑𝑡𝑗=1 max (∆𝑃𝑗 , 0)

(6)

𝑃𝑡− = ∑𝑡𝑗=1 ∆𝑃𝑗− = ∑𝑡𝑗=1 min(∆𝑃𝑗 , 0)

(7)

are the partial sums of the positive and negative changes in the price.
Introducing the short- and long-run asymmetries leads to the general form of the
NARDL(𝑝, 𝑞) model, which is
𝑝−1
+
+
−
−
+
−
∆𝑄𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜌𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝜃 + 𝑃𝑡−1
+ 𝜃 − 𝑃𝑡−1
+ ∑𝑝−1
𝑗=1 𝛾𝑖 ∆𝑄𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑗=1 ( 𝜋𝑗 ∆𝑃𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜋𝑗 ∆𝑃𝑡−𝑗 ) + 𝜀𝑡 .
(8)

Thus, the non-linear cointegrating regression can be written as
𝑄𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝑃𝑡+ + 𝛽 − 𝑃𝑡− + 𝑢𝑡 ,

(9)

where 𝛽 + = 𝜃 + /𝜌 and 𝛽 + = 𝜃 + /𝜌 is the long-run parameter of the regressor 𝑃𝑡 .
The long-run asymmetry can be captured by the parameters 𝜃 + = = 𝜌𝛽 + and 𝜃 − =
𝜌𝛽 − , while the short- run asymmetry is captured by the parameters 𝜋𝑗+ and 𝜋𝑗− . The long-run
asymmetry allows for asymmetry in the speed of adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium
level. The short-run asymmetry is meant to assess the asymmetric impact of changes in the price
of crude oil measured as WTI crude 𝑃𝑡 on the shale oil production 𝑄𝑡 . Furthermore, I test for
cointegration. According to the procedure of Shin et al. (2014), the null hypothesis of no
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cointegration 𝜌 = 𝜃 + = 𝜃 − = 0 can be tested using a modified F-statistics that is proposed by
Pesaran et al. (2001) and denoted by Fpss. According to methodology proposed by Banerjee et al.
(1998), the null hypothesis of no cointegration 𝜌 = 0 can be tested using the 𝑡𝐵𝐷𝑀 statistic
against the alternative hypothesis (𝜌 < 0). I fail to reject the null hypothesis if the empirical
values do not exceed the critical value.
The long- and short-run asymmetry in the relationship can be tested using the F form of
the Wald statistic. The null hypothesis to test the symmetry in the long-run is 𝜃 + = 𝜃 − . SYG
propose two tests for the short-run asymmetry. A strict-form tests the joint restricts 𝜋𝑗+ = 𝜋𝑗− for
𝑝−1 −
+
j=0,…, p-1. A weak-form tests the single restriction ∑𝑝−1
𝑗=0 𝜋𝑗 = ∑𝑗=0 𝜋𝑗 . SYG suggest that the

strict-form test is overly restrictive and suggest using the weak-form test. In our empirical work,
I follow their suggestion and use the weak-form for testing the short-run asymmetry.
In the NARDL model, the response of production to positive and negative shocks to price
are captured by the positive and negative cumulative dynamic multiplier associated with a unit
change in 𝑃𝑡+ and 𝑃𝑡− as follows:
ℎ

𝑚ℎ+

= ∑
𝑗=0

𝜕𝑄𝑡+𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑡+

and
𝑚ℎ− = ∑ℎ𝑗=0

𝜕𝑄𝑡+𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑡−

, ℎ = 0,1,2, …

(10)

SYG present an algorithm by which these dynamic multipliers can be computed from the
reduced form of 𝑄𝑡 in levels obtained from the ECM presented in (6). They show that as h→ ∞,
𝑚ℎ+ → 𝛽 + and 𝑚ℎ− → 𝛽 − . Recall that 𝛽 + and 𝛽 − are the asymmetric long-run coefficients. Based
on the multipliers, I can observe the subsequent deviations affecting the system dynamic
adjustment from the initial equlibrium to the new equilibrium between the system of variables,
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because the dynamic multipliers allow simultaneous analysis of the short-run and long-run
asymmetries.

2.4 Data

Empirical investigation in this study is conducted using ninety-six monthly observations of
the price of crude oil (WTI) and estimated shale oil production in the United States. The time
frame is from January 2011 to December 2018, with ninety-six total obervations. Although shale
oil production, hydraulic fracking, and horizontal drilling started earlier, in 2008, the technology
did not become available in the oil market until 2011. All series are expressed in natural
logarithm in the regression. The price of WTI represents the real log spot price of US$/barrel.
The total shale oil production is represented by thousands of barrels. Shale oil is represented on
the aggregate and disaggregate levels in order to shed light on asymmetric behavior among the
studied shale oil plays. The total shale oil production is from the following fields: Austin Chalk,
Bakken, Bone Spring, Eagle Ford, Mississipi, Niobrara, Permian, Wolfcamp, and Woodford.
The data of the spot price of WTI and shale oil production are from the Energy Information
Administration (EIA), while the consumer purchasing Index CPI is obtained from the Federal
Reserve Bank in St. Louis.
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2.5 Results and Discussion
Figures 2.2-2.4 show the time series for the real price of oil, total shale oil production,
and shale oil production by field in logs.

Figure 2.2. The real price of oil in logs and first difference.
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Figure 2.3. Total shale oil production in logs and first differences.
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Figure 2.4. Shale oil production by fields in logs and first difference.
Note: ac=Austin Chalk, bk= Bakken, bs= Bone Spring, ef=Eagle Ford, ms=Mississippi, nb=Niobrara, pm=Permian,
wc= Wolfcamp, wf=Woodford.
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There is a major drop in the price of oil in late 2014. This price decline is because of the increase
in oil supply from OPEC members in order to maintain their market share and the slowdown of
the global economy, as stated by Kleinberg et al. (2018) and Mӑnescu and Nuño (2015). Figure
2.3 shows that the total tight oil production increases between 2011-2014, decreases between the
third quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2016, and increases after the third quarter of
2016. At the disaggregate level, figure 2.4 shows that shale oil production significantly increased
since 2011. Production across the tight oil plays move together, but they do not share the same
trend. There is an increase in tight oil production between 2011-2014 for all the oil plays except
for Austin Chalk. Production flattens and decreases for Bakken, Eagle Ford, Mississippi,
Niobrara, and Woodford between the third quarter of 2014 and 2016 due to the price drop of
WTI. The production of all tight oil plays ramps up after 2016. Moreover, I observe that the
growth rate of production fluctuates between 2014-2016 for all the tight oil plays.
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the WTI price of crude oil and shale oil
production time series and their stochastic properties.

Table 2.2
Descriptive Statistics for the Log Levels and Growth Rates
Variable Max. Min.
mean
Sd.
skewness Kurtosis
2.546 3.889 8.161 0.367 -0.265
1.641
𝑃
0.211 -0.242 -0.007 0.082 -0.474
3.604
∆𝑃

ADF
-2.329
-9.944

𝑄
∆𝑄

8.902
0.085

6.909
-0.024

3.377
0.207

0.507
0.021

-0.912
0.113

2.849
2.892

-3.682
-3.657

𝐴𝐶
∆𝐴𝐶

3.450
0.291

4.481
-0.175

3.828
0.012

0.376
0.068

1.253
1.047

3.245
5.789

-1.082
-8.176

𝐵𝐾
∆𝐵𝐾

5.731
0.108

7.230
-0.089

6.776
0.015

0.386
0.032

-1.311
-0.338

3.747
3.779

-2.769
-6.043

𝐵𝑆
∆𝐵𝑆

3.338
0.206

6.337
-0.147

5.246
0.031

0.779
0.049

-0.844
0.147

2.679
5.326

-3.242
-7.856
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Table 2.2 – continued
𝐸𝐹
∆𝐸𝐹

4.251
0.165

𝑀𝑆
∆𝑀𝑆

7.389
-0.106

6.761
0.027

0.667
0.050

-1.780
0.679

5.392
3.525

-6.128
-3.396

2.820 5.688
-0.346 0.422

4.582
0.028

0.761
0.083

-0.594
0.199

2.407
11.918

-2.563
-9.405

𝑁𝐵
∆𝑁𝐵

4.058
0.118

5.320
0.023

0.627
0.036

-0.529
0.363

1.962
3.133

-1.497
-5.677

𝑃𝑀
∆𝑃𝑀

5.253 7.306
-0.064 0.078

6.235
0.210

0.563
0.222

-0.161
-0.936

2.001
5.958

-0.843
-8.949

𝑊𝐶
∆𝑊𝐶

3.782
0.166

7.127
-0.065

5.435
0.034

0.927
0.039

0.035
0.196

1.958
3.781

-2.184
-8.331

𝑊𝐹
∆𝑊𝐹

2.021
0.254

4.546
-0.255

3.787
0.026

0.709
0.077

-0.878
-0.012

2.551
4.681

-2.381
-8.949

6.248
-0.055

Note: ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The critical values with constant and trend are 4.053, -3.456, and -3.154 at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
ac=Austin Chalk, bk= Bakken, bs= Bone Spring, ef=Eagle Ford, ms=Mississippi, nb=Niobrara,
pm=Permian, wc= Wolfcamp, wf=Woodford.

As mentioned above, I use logarithmic growth rates. The growth rate of shale oil production is,
on average, positive, while the growth rate of the price of WTI is negative. The growth rate of
shale oil production is surged by the oil price spike in 2011, but the negative growth rate is
attributed to the lack of transportation infrastructure and the problem of US refinery capacity.
The results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test indicate the price series of crude oil
fails to reject the unit root at 10% and the total tight oil production fails to reject at 5%. At the
disaggregate level, all the tight oil plays’ production fail to reject the unit root at 10% level,
except for Bone Spring, which fails to reject at 5% level and Eagle Ford, which is trend
stationary. This means that I fail to reject the unit root in favor of a deterministic trend for all the
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series except for Eagle Ford. Therefore, I do not include a deterministic trend in our analysis.
The growth rate is positive for each tight oil play on average.
I estimated the impact of tight oil production on the price of crude oil; however, I did
not find evidence of reverse causality, as stated by Umekwe and Baek (2017). Thus, I proceed
with one equation estimation because of the one-way causality. I present the results from the
NARDL model, in which I estimate one equation: that is, the impact of the price of WTI on tight
oil production.
I estimated the specification model specified in equation (9) for the impact of the WTI
price on tight oil production in the United States. The lag structure of the unrestricted error
correction model is 3 in order to whiten the residuals. I then performed the F-form of the Wald
test (LR-F stat) to examine the long-run symmetry. The results are reported in table 2.3.
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Table 2.3
Dynamic Asymmetric Estimation of Shale Oil Production Adjustments
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Variable
Const.
Qt-1
+
𝑃𝑡−1
−
𝑃𝑡−1
∆𝑄𝑡−1
∆𝑄𝑡−2
+
∆𝑃𝑡−1
+
∆𝑃𝑡−2
+
∆𝑃𝑡−3
−
∆𝑃𝑡−1
−
∆𝑃𝑡−2
−
∆𝑃𝑡−3
LR-F stat
tBDM
FPSS
Adj R2
Serial corr.
p-value
SR-F stat

Coef.
0.218***
-0.026***
0.044***
0.027***
0.140
0.090
-0.030
-0.108***
-0.005
0.062***
0.036
-0.102***
29.09***
-3.723***
6.682**
0.58
0.24
1.354

Total shale production
Austin Chalk
S.E.
Coef.
S.E.
0.054
0.216
0.145
0.007
-0.067
0.044
0.008
0.068
0.063
0.012
0.010
0.039
0.090
0.071
0.109
0.089
-0.177
0.109
0.045
-0.196
0.225
-0.038
-0.043
0.197
0.040
-0.116
0.198
0.030
0.034
0.153
0.033
0.012
0.170
0.035
-0.030
0.`78
7.203***
-1.521
3.108
0.02
0.68
0.45

Bakken
Coef.
S.E.
0.311***
0.083
-0.042***
0.012
0.055***
0.021
0.039***
0.015
-0.091
0.107
-0.109
0.104
-0.048
0.088
-0.178***
0.078
-0.067
0.081
0.037
0.062
0.113
0.068
-0.078
0.072
6.218**
-3.295**
7.343**
0.29
0.84

Bone Spring
Coef.
S.E.
0.221***
0.057
-0.038***
0.013
0.106***
0.032
0.070***
0.024
-0.216**
0.101
-0.221**
0.096
0.159
0.138
-0.094
0.116
-0.086
0.118
0.047
0.030
0.009
0.033
-0.209
0.106
14.47***
-2.899
8.130**
0.20
0.1

Eagle Ford
Coef.
0.418***
-0.055***
0.052***
0.049***
-0.118
0.053
0.040
-0.109
-0.031
0.019
-0.088
0.417
0.13
-5.745
12.70***
0.70
0.93

0.103

0.15

0.01

S.E.
0.069
0.097
0.020
0.016
0.103
0.104
0.081
0.076
0.077
0.059
0.066
0.069

Table 2.3 – Continued
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Mississippi
Coef.
0.283
-0.057***
0.052
0.012
-0.462***
-0.174
-0.106
-0.242
-0.248
-0.041
0.103
0.030
5.33**
-1.98
2.17
0.16
0.19

S.E.
0.100
0.028
0.056
0.038
0.103
0.099
0.233
0.206
0.209
0.162
0.177
0.189

Niobrara
Coef.
0.052
-0.004
0.042
0.032
-0.004
0.014
0.049
-0.141
0.126
-0.023
0.084
0.0003
0.44
-0.24
1.245
0.07
0.60

S.E.
0.069
0.015
0.026
0.02
0.108
0.107
0.112
0.100
0.101
0.080
0.086
0.093

Permian
Coef.
0.184
-0.031
0.049
0.015
-0.182
-0.218
0.046
-0.068
0.075
0.012
0.030
-0.106
9.481***
-1.098
2.348
0.07
0.65

S.E.
0.149
0.028
0.024
0.010
0.103
0.100
0.067
0.056
0.057
0.082
0.105
0.053

Wolfcamp
Coef.
0.157
-0.028
0.043
0.005
-0.088
-0.228
-0.037
-0.128
-0.136
0.088
0.093
-0.009
6.288***

S.E.
0.09
0.024
0.035
0.018
0.106
0.104
0.122
0.107
0.107
0.089
0.92
0.099

Woodford
Coef.
0.193***
-0.044
0.041
0.033
-0.301***
-0.128
0.551***
-0.008
0.054
-0.162
0.208
0.003
0.133
-1.707
5.61*
0.17
0.96

S.E.
Const.
0.077
Qt-1
0.025
+
𝑃𝑡−1
0.052
−
0.041
𝑃𝑡−1
0.110
∆𝑄𝑡−1
0.109
∆𝑄𝑡−2
+
0.235
∆𝑃𝑡−1
+
0.216
∆𝑃𝑡−2
+
0.214
∆𝑃𝑡−3
−
∆𝑃𝑡−1
0.161
−
0.177
∆𝑃𝑡−2
−
0.189
∆𝑃𝑡−3
LR- F stat
tBDM
FPSS
0.61
Adj R2
0.02
Serial corr.
0.1
p-value
SR-F stat
1.49
0.57
0.475
2.14
0.345
Note: ***, **, * indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. LR-F stat represents the F-stat for the long-run asymmetry, SR-F stat represents the F- stat for
the short-run asymmetry. The critical values are 4.83, 3.09, and 2.35 at 1%, 5% and 10%. FPSS is the F-stat for the cointegration test (Pesaran et al, 2001) with the
critical values 5.09,3 6.31, and 9.14 at 10%, 5%, and 1%. t BDM is test statistics for the cointegration (Banerjee et al. (1998) with the critical values -3.22, -3.56, 4.22 at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Serial corr. Refers to the serial correlation based on Portmantau test.
The estimations and tests were conducted using a program code written in STATA which was produced by M. Sunder and retrieved from Matthew GreenwoodNimmo’s webpage.

The results suggest that I reject the null hypothesis of long-run symmetry in favor of long-run
asymmetry for the price of WTI-shale oil production relationship (LR-F stat=29.09). This
asymmetry can be attributed to infrastructure and transportation problems, legal obligations,
hedging on contracts, and production from sweet spots. It can also be observed that shale oil
production is more sensitive to an increase in the price of WTI than a decrease. The long-run
coefficients are 𝑃𝑡+ = 0.044 and 𝑃𝑡− = 0.026, and they are statistically significant at 1%. Therefore,
I may conclude that a 1% increase in the price level of WTI results in a 4.4% rise in the level of
shale oil production. Similarly, a 1% decrease in the price level of WTI leads to a 2.6% decrease
in the level of shale oil production. Hence, the results indicate that a greater effect is caused by
the positive changes in price.
Table 2.3 also presents both the 𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑆 bounds test and 𝑡𝐵𝐷𝑀 of the benchmark model (8)
to allow for asymmetry. The results from the cointegration test clearly point to a valid long-run
relationship between shale oil production and the price of WTI. The finding that the price of
WTI is cointegrated with total shale production confirms the existence of linear estimation for
the argument of this paper. The portmanteau test for serial correlation is performed. The P-value
is reported, and it is insignificant, suggesting that the model is correctly specified, with no serial
correlation between the residuals.
The short-run parameters are also reported in table 2.3. I observe that the positive
coefficient ∆𝑃𝑡+ is larger than the negative coefficient ∆𝑃𝑡− . These coefficients suggest that a
positive change in the price of WTI yields a larger impact on shale oil production than a negative
price change of WTI; however, these coefficients are not statistically significant. Furthermore,
the short-run F stat as shown in table 2.3 is SR-F stat= 1.354. This means that I fail to reject
symmetric behavior in the short-run in the price of WTI and shale oil production relationship.
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I disaggregate shale oil production into the major oil plays—Austin Chalk, Bakken, Bone
Spring, Eagle Ford, Mississipi, Niobrara, Permian, Wolfcamp, and Woodford—to obtain deeper
insight into each play individually. The results from table 2.3 indicate that I reject long-run
symmetry in favor of asymmetry between the price of oil and shale oil produced from these
fields: Austin Chalk, Bakken, Bone Spring, Mississipi, Permian, and Wolfcamp. However,
asymmetricity is rejected for Niobrara, Eagle Ford, and Woodford. As mentioned earlier, the
asymmetric relationship between shale oil production and the price of WTI results from the
geographical location of each play and the proximity to pipelines and infrastructure, as stated by
Krane and Agerton (2015). For example, one of the major shale oil plays, Bakken, is located in
North Dakota; it is not until 2014 that the problem of transportation is solved. The common
factor between the oil fields that do not show asymmetric behavior in the long run is their
geographical location. As shown in figure 2.5, these fields are located close to the hub of crude
oil storage in Cushing, Oklahoma.
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Figure 2.5. A map of U.S. tight oil plays, petroleum reﬁneries and crude oil pipelines.
Coordinates are gathered from EIA and the U.S. map data is created by Charlie Fitzpatrick at the
Environmental Systems Research Institute.

Other fields, such as Eagle Ford and Permian, have the advantage of being close to the
infrastructure and transportation of the downstream industry (the refining sector) in the south and
southeast of Texas. Niobrara does not show asymmetric behavior in the long run either. I may
attribute that to the fact that Niobrara experienced plenty of oil well drilling over the last decade
in more productive “sweet spots” that make production economically feasible and profitable,
even when WTI is at a low price.
Another factor to consider is the productivity of the wells drilled in the play and how
long the field has been in service. For example, Bakken and Wolfcamp have been booming since
the technological innovations of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking. Both oil fields are
producing more than one million barrels per day. High-production oil fields are most likely
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associated with large operation costs. Also, the big start-up is accompanied by a high shut-down
cost. This is because it is economically feasible to continue running, as opposed to shutting
down.
At the disaggregate level, I can observe that at the play level, shale oil production is more
sensitive to positive shocks than negative shocks. That is true for all plays, even for those that do
not show asymmetry. And again, the 𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑆 and 𝑡𝐵𝐷𝑀 in table 2.3 provide evidence in favor of
rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration for Bakken, Bone Spring, Eagle Ford, and
Woodford, while I fail to reject the null hypothesis for Austin Chalk, Mississippi, Niobrara,
Permian, and Wolfcamp. A possible reason for the non-detection of a causal long-run
relationship might be the existence of nonlinearities among those variables. The short-run
parameters for each field are also reported in table 2.3. Again, I observe that the positive
coefficient is larger than the negative coefficient. However, the coefficients are not statistically
significant.
Figures 2.6-2.15 (below) show the plot of the cumulative dynamic multipliers obtained in
equation (9) for total tight oil production and for disaggregate level by field. The main advantage
of the dynamic multipliers ensuring NARDL to be a preferable and powerful technique is to
allow simultaneous analysis of the short-run and long-run asymmetries by shedding light onto
the traverse between short-run disequilibrium and long-run equilibrium. The cumulative
multipliers plot show patterns of shale oil production adjustment to the long-run equilibrium
following a positive or negative shock. The dynamic multipliers have been estimated based on
the NARDL model presented in table 2.3 (above). The positive and negative shocks captured the
adjustment of shale oil production at a given forecast horizon, which is selected to be 100 in this
study. The asymmetric curve represents the difference between the positive and negative shocks
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(𝑚ℎ+ − 𝑚ℎ− ), and it has been bootstrapped 50 times at a 95% confidence interval. If the
asymmetric line is located between the positive and negative shocks around the zero line, then
the asymmetric effect is not significant.
Figure 2.6 shows the adjustment of total tight oil production to the positive and negative
shocks to the price of WTI.

Figure 2.6. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus total shale production.

It can be observed that asymmetry does exist in the shale oil production-price of WTI
relationship. I observe that total shale production responds more rapidly to increases in the price
of crude oil than to decreases. The size of the positive shock is 1.5 times the negative shock. The
gap in magnitude between positive and negative shocks in the price of crude oil does not
diminish and disappear over time. These findings, in particular the behavior of tight oil
production in the case of a decreasing price of WTI, are indicative of a long-run phenomenon.
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I also take a deep look at the disaggregate level by field (shown below in figures 2.72.15). I find the asymmetric effect in Austin Chalk (figure 2.7), Bakken (figure 2.8), Bone Spring
(figure 2.9), Mississippi (figure 2.11), Niobrara (figure 2.12), Permian (figure 2.13), and
Wolfcamp (figure 2.14).

Figure 2.7. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus shale production of Austin
Chalk.
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Figure 2.8. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus shale production of Bakken.

Figure 2.9. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus shale production of Bone
Spring.
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Figure 2.10. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus shale production of Eagle
Ford.

Figure 2.11. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus shale production of
Mississippi.
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Figure 2.12. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus shale production of
Niobrara.

Figure 2.13. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus shale production of
Permian.
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Figure 2.14. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus shale production of
Wolfcamp.

Figure 2.15. Dynamic multipliers plot for the real price of oil versus shale production of
Woodford.
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Here I explain the dynamic multipliers plot for two of the biggest tight oil plays: Bakken and
Permian. Regarding the dynamic cumulative multipliers of the price of oil on tight oil
production from the Bakken, the study of the dynamic multipliers presented in figure 2.8 (above)
reveals that it is mainly positive changes in the price of oil that cause Bakken production to
respond. More particularly, production in the Bakken responds more rapidly and significantly
more strongly to positive changes in price of oil. The magnitude of the positive shock is 1.5
times the negative shock.
The dynamic cumulative adjustment for the Permian tight oil play is shown in figure 2.13
(above). I observe that Permian production responds more strongly to increases in the price of
WTI than to decreases. The long-run effect as depicted by the asymmetry line indicates that tight
oil production has a larger response to a price increase than to a price decrease. The size of the
positive shock is twice as big as the negative shock. The behavior of the dynamic multiplier
shows a long-run asymmetry.

2.6 Conclusion

This study analyzes the relationship between the price of oil and shale oil production in a
nonlinear cointegration ARDL framework in the aggregate and disaggregate level, using Shin et
al.(2014). The relationship determines whether the United States is a swing producer or a
marginal producer in the oil market. I find evidence of long-run asymmetry between the price of
oil and shale oil production over the studied time frame, from January 2011 to December 2018. I
find the same evidence for the majority of the shale oil fields—Austin Chalk, Bakken, Bone
Spring, Mississippi, Permian, and Wolfcamp—in the long-run. I attribute the long-run
asymmetry to several factors, such as the role of marginal producer, legal obligations, hedging
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on contracts, proximity to pipelines and infrastructure, capacity constraints, and drilling in sweet
spots. However, the long-run symmetry fails to reject for the Eagle Ford, Niobrara, and
Woodford shale oil fields. I may attribute that to the proximity to infrastructure and the refining
sector.
It can be inferred from this study that tight oil producers are marginal producers. The
drop of the price of WTI crude during the month of April 2020 to $15, with no reduction in tight
oil production, supports the claim of this study. One of the limitations of this study is that the
data used does not cover all the tight oil plays, such as the Barnett play within the Fort Worth
basin in Texas.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYZING THE TIME-VARYING SPILLOVERS ACROSS THE MAJOR CRUDE OIL
BENCHMARKS
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine integration in the international crude oil market.
This analysis is conducted by investigating the volatility spillover of future oil prices within and
across three major benchmarks in international crude oil trading: West Texas Intermediate
(WTI), Brent (blend), and Dubai (Fateh). Integration in the oil market is a critical factor in
understanding regional oil price volatility. For example, when there is geopolitical uncertainty in
the Middle East and an arbitrage exists, investors could increase their profits by trading across
multiple markets. This process would cause the oil prices to change in the other markets and
cause the volatility to transmit across markets. Studying the uncertainty of oil prices is important,
as the volatility of the price of oil has significant effects on the shaping and growth of economies
(Mohaddes and Pesaran, 2017; Jarret, Mohaddes, and Mohtadi, 2019; Liu and Gong, 2020) and
plays a vital role in the performance of financial markets (Gusemi and Fattoum, 2014; Zhang,
Chavillier, and Gusemi, 2017; Degiannakis, Filis, and Vora; 2018).
Crude oil is traded globally based on its quality and characteristics. There are two
parameters that determine the quality of crude oil in international markets: the American
Petroleum Institute gravity (API) and the sulfur content. The higher the API, the lighter the crude
oil, which in turn means a higher percentage of light and middle products, such as gasoline and
diesel. “Sour” crude oil contains a higher sulfur content; “sweet” crude oil refers to a low sulfur
content. In general, crude oil with high API and low sulfur content, such as WTI and Brent, is
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priced higher than crude oil with low API and high sulfur content, such as Dubai. In international
oil markets, buyers and sellers depend on the benchmark “price markers” in order to price
different types of crude oil.
In the last two decades, the global oil market has witnessed new developments that are
considered major drivers of volatility in the world market. An example of this is the shale oil
revolution: The shale oil boom dramatically changed the crude oil supply (Ji and Fan, 2015;
Ewing and Malik, 2017; Zhang, Ji and Kutan, 2019). Moreover, the crude oil market has become
highly volatile (Ji, Liu, and Fan, 2018; Ji and Nehler, 2018). Uncertainty about the state of the
global economy in late 2018 and early 2019 was another driver for the volatility of the price of
oil globally. An example of that uncertainty is the increased trade tensions between the United
States and China. Elevated tensions in trade bring uncertainty to the energy sector (Meng, Su,
Hao, and Tao, 2020; Fattouh and Economou, 2019).
The financialization of the crude oil market is one of the new developments that global
markets have witnessed recently. Financialization, or increased marketization, as stated by
Focacci (2017), lead to a deregulation in the financial markets. Deregulation has led to a
dramatic increase in new investors. An example of financialization is the technological
financialization infrastructure. Technological financialization promotes the possibility of
investing in oil without the cost of storage or constraints, leading massive numbers of speculators
to engage in future markets. Tang and Xiong (2012) find that there was a growth of non-energy
commodities that have become highly correlated with the price of WTI. Büyükşahin and Robe
(2014) find that the correlation between equities and commodities is increasing after the financial
crisis in 2008. Basak and Pavlova (2016) find that the correlation between the price of WTI
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crude and S&P 500 is positive and increasing. However, the correlation between S&P 500 and
Brent crude is close to zero.
The relationship among oil prices across different geographical locations has been
studied by several scholars. For example, Wlazlowski, Hagstromer, and Giulietti (2011) study
the interdependence of thirty-two crude oil prices. The authors find that WTI, Brent, and Russian
Urals are important price setters in international crude oil markets. Kauffman and Banerjee
(2014) examine thirty-three spot crude oil prices and find that the long-run relationship depends
on geographical location, geopolitics, and economic indicators. Ji and Fan (2016) assess the
pricing power of twenty-four crude oil prices. They find that the United States and Saudi Arabia
are the core of the global oil market. The studies above exhibit an important limitation: They use
cointegration and the Granger causality procedures, which assume consistent parameters and
cannot analyze the time-varying characteristics of the markets described above.
A general consensus has not been established in regard to treating the world oil market as
a single market or as different regions. Early scholars who studied market integration, such as
Weiner (1991), found that the world oil market is regionalized, there are no transactions between
two geographical locations, and there is no tendency of comovement between the price of oil
across different regions. Adelman (1992) refuted Weiner’s (1991) argument, stating that
arbitrage lowers the price difference between two locations if the price of oil varies by more than
the transportation cost based on the law of one price. Although there is a plethora of research that
studies spillovers of the oil market into the stock market, there is still limited research regarding
volatility spillovers in the oil market. Liu and Gong (2020) study volatility transmission between
different benchmarks. They find that volatility spillover increases at the time of market
uncertainty and that the oil market has become more connected in recent years. Zhang, Ji, and
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Kutan (2019) find that the world oil market is more connected during times of crisis, and also
find evidence of heterogeneity across regional markets.
In this paper, I contribute to the literature by studying spillovers between different
geographical locations in the international oil market. Specifically, I examine to what extent
international oil markets are linked and interact. In this study I focus on the volatility
transmission mechanism and market connectedness among three important crude oil benchmarks
in the international oil market; these are the future prices for WTI, Brent, and Dubai. I employ
the Generalized Autoregressive Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model that was developed by
Bollerslev (1986) and the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model that was developed by
Engle (2002) in order to investigate volatility spillovers between WTI, Brent, and Dubai. The
DCC model is widely used to capture volatility transmission between markets and I believe that
it is appropriate for the transmission process. The DCC GARCH model utilizes one-day
contemporaneous correlation. I extend my analysis to consider longer horizon directional and
time-varying characteristics of spillovers in international oil markets. I proceed to the measures
of connectedness, which were proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2014). The Diebold and
Yilmaz framework enables us to analyze volatility spillovers across international oil markets
using empirical techniques from the time domain for more than a one-day horizon. Their
connectedness indexes quantify how the variables in the system are tied together by measuring
the shares of the forecast error decomposition due to other shocks. I also employ a rolling
analysis to allow for time-varying dynamics in the returns of the major crude oil benchmarks
following the technique of Diebold and Yilmaz.
I summarize the main finding of this paper as follows: I find that volatility spillover
varies over time for the DCC GARCH and return spillover for the connectedness models. In
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general, I find that there is strong integration in international crude oil markets during times of
market turbulence. This finding is consistent with Ji and Fan (2015) and Zhang, Ji, and Kutan
(2019). The DCC GARCH model provides evidence of comovement among the benchmarks of
WTI, Brent, and Dubai. I find that the correlation estimates between WTI and Brent and Brent
and Dubai are less than the correlation between WTI and Dubai. I may attribute the deviation of
WTI from Brent to the regional shock of shale oil production that diverges the benchmark of
WTI from Brent. The high correlation between WTI and Dubai can be explained by the fact that
these benchmarks are the key players in Asian markets, as stated by Zhang et al. (2019). The
evidence from the Diebold and Yilmaz procedure shows that the own benchmark return spillover
accounts for the largest share of forecast error variance decomposition. The results from the
rolling window approach imply that the benchmark of WTI is a net transmitter and that Brent is a
net receiver. The benchmark of Dubai fluctuates between net transmitter and net receiver. The
finding of this paper is consistent with Liu and Gong (2020) and Kuck and Schweikert (2017).
Following this introduction, section 3.2 describes the data used for this empirical study.
Section 3.3 provides insight on the econometric modelling for both the DCC GARCH model and
the connectedness measures. Section 3.4 presents the empirical finding, and section 3.5 presents
the concluding remarks.

3.2 Data
In this paper, I use 954 daily observations on crude oil future prices in the WTI, Brent,
and Dubai markets. The time period spans from January 4, 2016 to November 14, 2019. All
prices are expressed in (US$/bbl). The price of crude oil represents the price of the one-month
future contract closest to the expiration date of the contract, rolling forward to the following
business day of the delivery month. Three benchmarks were chosen because they represent three
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important markets where most crude oil is traded: the US, Europe, and East Asian markets. The
three series are obtained from the Bloomberg terminal for the closing price. All the prices are in
natural logarithm form. The return of each price is calculated by taking the log difference of the
price level.

3.3 Econometric Modelling
In this section I discuss the econometric methodology that I employ to empirically
address the question of the market integration in my research. I utilize two approaches to study
the dynamic relationship between the major crude oil benchmarks WTI, Brent, and Dubai. The
first approach uses the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002), which
provides time-varying conditional variances and cross-market conditional correlations. This is
done by decomposing the covariance matrix into standard deviation and correlation matrices.
The DCC model allows the examination of the correlation across international oil markets, but
the DCC model utilizes one period. I would like to analyze the dynamic feedback and extend the
analysis to more than a one-day horizon; therefore, I proceed to the second approach. The second
approach is based on a VAR model and generalized forecasting error decomposition. This
methodology, which was recently developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2014), provides an
index of spillover connectedness in the static form. I employ the rolling window procedure in
order to estimate the time-varying benchmark-wise market network.

3.3.1 DCC GARCH Model

In this section, the returns are first modeled in a vector autoregression framework (VAR),
and then I use the DCC GARCH to estimate the time-varying correlations. The DCC-GARCH
model is used to model the time variant volatility transmission among three different benchmarks
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in the world crude oil market. These are the daily returns of WTI, denoted as 𝑟𝑤𝑡𝑖 ; the daily
returns of Brent, denoted as 𝑟𝑏𝑟 ; and the daily returns of Dubai, denoted as 𝑟𝑑𝑏 .
Let 𝑟𝑡 be a 3x1 vector of the daily returns. The process for 𝑟𝑡 conditional on the
information set 𝐼𝑡−1 can be written as
𝑝

𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝛷𝑖 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖=1

𝜀𝑡 \𝐼𝑡−1 ~𝑁(0, 𝐻𝑡 ).

(1)

The error term 𝜀𝑡 from equation (1) can be defined as
1/2

𝜀𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡 𝜗𝑡

(2)

where 𝐻𝑡 is the conditional covariance matrix of 𝑟𝑡 and 𝜗𝑡 is a 3x1 i.i.d vector of normal
innovations.
The conditional covariance matrix can be decomposed as
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡 𝑅𝑡 𝐷𝑡

(3)

where 𝐷𝑡 is a diagonal matrix that contains the conditional standard deviations √ℎ𝑖𝑡
0
0
√ℎ1𝑡
𝐷𝑡 = [ 0
0

√ℎ2𝑡
0

0 ].

(4)

√ℎ3𝑡

The conditional variances are specified to be GARCH(1,1) models
2
ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 𝜀𝑡−1
+ 𝛽𝑖 ℎ𝑡−1 .

(5)

The 3x3 matrix 𝑅𝑡 contains the time-varying conditional correlation
1
𝑅𝑡 = [𝜌21,𝑡
𝜌31,𝑡

𝜌12,𝑡
1
𝜌32,𝑡

𝜌13,𝑡
𝜌23,𝑡 ]
1

(6)

where 𝐻𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡 are positive definite. Then 𝑅𝑡 is decomposed into
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑄𝑡∗ 𝑄𝑡 𝑄𝑡∗
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𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏)𝑄̅ + 𝑎𝜀𝑡−1 𝜀′𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑄𝑡−1

(7)

where 𝑄̅ is the unconditional covariance matrix between series in (1), 𝑎 and 𝑏 are scalars, and 𝑄𝑡∗
is a diagonal matrix that has on its diagonal squared elements of the matrix 𝑄𝑡 :

√𝑞11𝑡
𝑄𝑡 = [ 0

0
√𝑞22𝑡

0

0

0
0 ].

(8)

√𝑞33𝑡

Finally, the elements of the R matrix can be written as
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =

𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡
√𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡 𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑡

.

(9)

Both 𝐻𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑡 are positive definite if 𝑄𝑡 is positive definite. The conditions
𝑎 ≥ 0, 𝑏 ≥ 0, 𝑎 + 𝑏 ≤ 1
ensure that 𝑄𝑡 is positive definite.
Engle and Shepard (2001) and Engle (2002) propose estimating the DCC-GARCH model
by a two-step estimation process. In the first step, I estimate a univariate GARCH model for each
return series. Then, in the second step, I take the residuals from the first step, standardize them
by using the estimated standard deviations, and estimate the dynamic correlations by maximum
likelihood.

3.3.2 Connectedness Measures

To measure the directional connectedness and interdependencies across the markets, I
employ the model that was proposed earlier by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2014). This model
measures volatility spillovers based on the forecast error in the system that contains the world
crude oil market benchmarks: WTI, Brent, and Dubai.
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Consider a covariance stationary three variables VAR(p) as in (1). The moving average
representation of the VAR model can be written as:
∞

𝑟𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖 𝜖𝑡−𝑖

(10)

𝑖=1

where the 3x3 coefficient matrices 𝐴𝑖 can be derived recursively as 𝐴𝑖 = 𝛷1 𝐴𝑖−1 + 𝛷2 𝐴𝑖−2 +
𝛷3 𝐴𝑖−3 + ⋯, with 𝐴0 = 𝐼𝑛 and 𝐴𝑖 = 0 for 𝑖 < 0. I transform these moving average coefficient
matrices in order to obtain the variance decomposition of the H-step ahead forecast error
variance of each daily return series in the VAR(p) model. I utilize the generalized forecast error
variance decomposition of Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), which
is robust to the ordering of the variables. I define variable 𝑗′𝑠 contributes to variables 𝑖′𝑠 H-step
ahead generalized forecast error variance as
𝑔
𝜃𝑖𝑗 (𝐻)

=

′
𝜎𝑗𝑗−1 ∑𝐻−1
ℎ=0 (𝑒𝑖 𝐴ℎ ∑𝑒𝑗 )²

(11)

′
′
∑𝐻−1
ℎ=0 (𝑒𝑖 𝐴ℎ 𝛺𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑗 )²

where 𝑒𝑖 is the selection vector with i-th element as 1 and 0 elsewhere, and 𝜎𝑗𝑗 is the standard
deviation of error term 𝜖𝑡 of the 𝑗th equation, ∑ is the variance matrix of the vector of the errors
𝜖𝑡 . Next, I normalize the variance decomposition matrix such that the rows sum to one
𝑔

𝑔
𝜃̇𝑖𝑗 (𝐻)

=

𝜃𝑖𝑗 (𝐻)
∑3𝑗=1 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑔 (𝐻)

,

(12)

𝑔
where 𝜃̇𝑖𝑗 (𝐻) is the measure of pairwise directional connectedness from the benchmark 𝑗 to

benchmark 𝑖 at horizon H.
The normalization enables us to interpret the variance decomposition and it provides a
directional measure of the pairwise connectedness from 𝑗 to 𝑖 through the horizon 𝐻. This can be
expressed as
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𝑔
𝐶𝑖←𝑗 (𝐻) = 𝜃̇𝑖𝑗 (𝐻)

(13)

where the notation 𝐶𝑖←𝑗 (𝐻) represent the transmission and the pairwise directional
connectedness can be defined as
𝐶𝑖𝑗 (𝐻) = 𝐶𝑖←𝑗 (𝐻) − 𝐶𝑗←𝑖 (𝐻)

(14)

where a positive (negative) value of 𝐶𝑖𝑗 (𝐻) indicates that variable 𝑖 dominates (is dominated)
variable 𝑗.
These statistics have the advantage of informing which benchmark of crude oil plays the main
role in the world oil market. The main focus is to determine how the other crude oil benchmarks
contribute to a single crude oil benchmark. I derive the aggregate “from” and “to” connectedness
measure in order to examine the total “influence” for a variable 𝑖 on the system VAR(𝑝) model
𝐶𝑖←∎ (𝐻) =

∑3𝑗=1 𝑗≠𝑖 𝜃̇𝑖𝑗𝑔 (𝐻)
3

𝑋 100

(15)

where the notation 𝐶𝑖←∎ (𝐻) represents the total directional connectedness from the other crude
oil benchmarks to a single benchmark. Using the same concept, I can also compute how a
particular crude oil benchmark 𝑖 contributes to the shocks of all other crude oil benchmarks by
aggregating partially. The total directional connectedness from benchmark 𝑖 to all other
benchmarks is denoted as 𝐶∎←𝑖 (𝐻) and can be calculated as
𝐶∎←𝑖 (𝐻) =

∑3𝑗=1 𝑗≠𝑖 𝜃𝑗𝑖̇ 𝑔 (𝐻)
3

𝑋 100.

(16)

Thus, the net total directional connectedness for a specific benchmark 𝑖 can be computed as
𝐶𝑖 (𝐻) = 𝐶∎←𝑖 (𝐻) − 𝐶𝑖←∎ (𝐻).

(17)

If the net total directional connectedness 𝐶(𝐻) of the variable 𝑖 is positive (negative), that means
variable 𝑖 is a net transmitter (receiver) of shocks or that the variable 𝑖 is driving (driven by) the
system. The total aggregation of the variance decomposition across the three benchmarks
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measures the system wide connectedness. The total connectedness in all markets can be
calculated as
∑3𝑖=1 𝐶∎←𝑖 (𝐻)
∑3𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖←∎ (𝐻)
𝑐(𝐻) =
=
.
3
3

(18)

Finally, I use a rolling window procedure in order to model the time-varying dynamics of the
connectedness across the benchmarks in the sample. The connectedness dynamics across the
markets is measured using a 100-days rolling window and a 25-days ahead forecast horizon. I
choose this horizon in order to measure connectedness over the hedging periods.

3.4 Results and Discussion

Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the daily returns on WTI, Brent, and
Dubai.

Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics and Unit Root Test for Daily Return Series
Mean Max.
Min
Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis
𝑟𝑤𝑡 0.045

13.694

-8.233

2.281

0.344

3.957

𝑟𝑏𝑟 0.062

13.639

-8.106
13.861

2.039

0.259

4.039

𝑟𝑑𝑏 0.068

14.742

1.776

0.277

16.849

JB test
640.11
(0.0)
658.82
(0.0)
1286.1
(0.0)

ADF

LM-ARCH
60.22 (0.0)*

-33.305*
44.06 (0.0)*
-33.462*
4.37 (0.67)
-33.313*

Note: JB is the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality test statistics with two degrees of freedom and follows 𝜒 2
distribution. ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics for unit root at lag level of 1 based on Bayesian
Information Criteria. The P-value is reported between parentheses. * is the significance level at 1%. LM-ARCH is
the Engle Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity at lag length of 5.

The table shows that Dubai has the largest mean returns at 0.068%, followed by Brent at 0.062%.
The crude of WTI has the smallest return, 0.045%. As measured by the standard deviation, the
most volatile is the crude price of WTI, followed by Brent, then Dubai. In general, the returns of
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all the return series are skewed to the right and are not normally distributed. Furthermore, the
series exhibits excess kurtosis, suggesting that the GARCH model is appropriate. Table 3.1 also
presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. The ADF tests rejects
the null hypothesis of unit root for all the crude oil return series. The Lagrange Multiplier test for
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (LM-ARCH) is also provided in table 3.1. The
return series for WTI and Brent significantly reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative
hypothesis of the presence of ARCH effects. I fail to reject the null hypothesis for the return
series on Dubai crude. When I extend the multivariate framework, I do find ARCH in the Dubai
returns.
Figure 3.1 shows the daily returns for WTI, Brent, and Dubai and indicates that the
volatility has varied across time.

Figure 3.1. The daily return series.
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The returns of WTI and Brent are more volatile, and the volatility clusters appears to be highly
persistent. The Dubai returns are less volatile than the crude of WTI and Brent. I may attribute
the higher volatility to the fact that both WTI and Brent are characterized as light and sweet
crude oils. Light and sweet crude oil is less abundant and in higher demand than the sour and
heavier grade, as stated by Chang, Mcleer, and Tansuchat (2010). All the return series
experienced volatility clustering in 2016. This may be attributed to the shale oil boom and the
plunge of the price of crude oil, as stated by Liu and Gong (2020). Figure 3.1 also shows that
there are more spikes in 2019, which can be attributed to uncertainty about the global economy,
as stated by Meng, Su, Hao, and Tao (2020), as well as the growth in shale oil production, as
stated by Fattouh and Economou (2019).
Table 3.2 presents the parameters estimated from the DCC GARCH model for crude oil
returns 𝑟𝑤𝑡𝑖 , 𝑟𝑏𝑟 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑑𝑏 .
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Table 3.2
DCC-GARCH Models Estimate
𝑟𝑤𝑡
Mean Equation
-0.068
𝑟𝑤𝑡
(0.051)
-0.013
𝑟𝑏𝑟
(0.045)
0.054
𝑟𝑑𝑏
(0.04)
Variance Equation
0.150*
𝜔
(0.079)

𝑟𝑏𝑟

𝑟𝑑𝑏

Const

0.127***
(0.039)
-0.076**
(0.035)
0.068**
(0.031)

-0.007
(0.075)
0.048
(0.067)
-0.138**
(0.060)

0.063
(0.077)
0.077
(0.069)
0.076
(0.061)

0.126*
(0.07)

0.020*
(0.01)

𝛼

0.069***
(0.024)

0.066***
(0.022)

0.008**
(0.003)

𝛽

0.900***
(0.034)

0.902***
(0.036)

0.984***
(0.002)

20.58 [0.90]
15.19 [0.76]

39.82 [0.13]
13.86 [0.83]

DCC estimates
a
b

Diagnostic tests
LM- ARCH
Q (20)

0.211***
(0.038)
0.558***
(0.082)

38.19[0.14]
24.81[0.21]

Note: ***, **, * denote the significance level of the estimates at 1%, 5%, and 10%. The estimates between
parentheses are the standard errors. LM-ARCH is the Engle Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedasticity at lag length of 20. For LM-ARCH and Q test statistic of Ljung-Box test, the
reported estimates are the P-values. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation is tested up to lag 20.

I determine the optimal lag-length based on Bayesian Information Criteria; accordingly, the
chosen lag-length is 1. I proceed to fit the VAR(1) model to the three log price returns of each
benchmark. To assure our models are correctly specified, I conduct diagnostic tests for the
residuals, as shown in the bottom part of table 3.2. I use the LM-ARCH test and Ljung-Box test.
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I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects and the null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation among the residuals, suggesting that the models are correctly specified.
The first part of table 3.2 represents the fitted VAR model in the mean equation and the
standard errors. The estimates are statistically significant for the daily returns of Brent across the
system; however, the results are not significant for WTI and Dubai. The second part of the table
presents the estimated variance equations, which are fitted to the residuals of the VAR(1) model
of the return series for WTI, Brent, and Dubai. The values of both 𝛼 and 𝛽 are significant at the
1% level across all three GARCH models. They satisfy the condition 𝛼+ 𝛽 <1, suggesting that
the unconditional variances are finite. The low values of 𝛼′𝑠 and the high values of 𝛽’s indicate
that the correlation in the squared shocks is highly persistent. In the third part of the table, the
DCC estimates of 𝑎 and 𝑏 are statistically significant at the 1% significance level. I can clearly
interpret the model correlation structure as a non-constant interaction of the three crude oil
benchmarks of WTI, Brent, and Dubai.
Table 3.3 presents the unconditional correlation matrix of crude oil price returns for each
benchmark.

Table 3.3
Correlation Matrix
𝑟𝑤𝑡
𝑟𝑏𝑟
𝑟𝑑𝑏

𝑟𝑤𝑡
1
0.112
0.728

𝑟𝑏𝑟

𝑟𝑑𝑏

1
0.10

1

All the values are positive, which shows that the crude oil benchmarks tend to move in the same
direction. The highest correlation of crude oil price returns is between WTI and Dubai. The
Asian markets play an integral role in these benchmarks. As stakeholders in the Asian markets,
Dubai and WTI identify the importance of Asian importers. Dubai is the benchmark of crude oil
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flowing from the Middle East to Asian markets. The exportation of WTI crude to Asian markets
has increased over the last few years, as stated by Zhang et al. (2019). The lowest correlation is
between Brent and Dubai. The correlation between WTI and Brent is also low. This is consistent
with Kanamura (2015) and Basak and Pavlova (2016), who find evidence of deviation of WTI
from Brent. I attribute the low correlation between WTI and Brent to the regional shock that was
caused by the shale oil revolution. It can be inferred that the changes in the price of WTI crude
have a larger effect on the price of Dubai than the changes in the price of Brent crude.
I next examine the estimated time-varying conditional variances and correlations. Figure
3.2 presents the plot of the conditional variances over time based on the estimation results of the
DCC GARCH model.

Figure 3.2. Conditional variances.
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Figure 3.2 shows that the conditional variances are not constant over time and are especially
volatile during the period of 2016-2017 (shale oil production growth) and during 2019 (during
uncertainty about the state of the global economy).
Next, I calculated the dynamic conditional correlation estimates between the crude oil
returns. The results are reported in figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3. Dynamic conditional correlation between returns.

The positive dynamic correlation indicated the comovement between the return of WTI, Brent,
and Dubai. The conditional correlation ranges from -.58 to .95 between WTI and Brent, from
-.34 to .96 between WTI and Dubai, and from -.74 to .92 between Brent and Dubai. These ranges
suggest that the conditional correlations vary considerably over time. On average, the conditional
correlation between WTI and Brent is zero; however, there are periodic upward spikes,
especially in 2019. These upward spikes suggest a co-movement due to uncertainty in the global
economy. There is a correlation pattern between WTI and Dubai; however, the correlation has
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downward spikes. The periodic downward spikes suggest a disconnection between the two
benchmarks. This disconnection may be explained by the local shock from shale oil production
and speculative behavior in the crude oil future markets, as stated by Kaufman (2011). The
conditional correlation between Brent and Dubai is zero on average, with a periodic pattern of
upward spikes in 2019.
Having found high frequency variation and correlation among the crude oil benchmarks,
I proceed with the connectedness measures framework of Diebold and Yilmaz in order to reveal
the multi-period directional and time-varying features of the returns. I first consider the static
spillover connectedness where fixed parameters across the same sample period. The results are
reported in table 3.4.

Table 3.4
Connectedness Matrix for the Daily Returns
WTI
WTI
70.99
Brent
0.25
Dubai
28.37
To
9.41
Net
-0.23

Brent
0.79
99.02
0.79
0.53
0.21

Dubai
28.13
0.73
71.24
9.62
-0.08

From
9.64
0.33
9.59
19.56

The 𝑖𝑗th element of the matrix in table 3.4 presents the estimated contribution to the forecast
error variance of the variable 𝑖 from innovations to the variable 𝑗, as shown in equation (12). The
off-diagonal sum of elements in each row represents the directional spillover from other
variables to variable 𝑖. The off-diagonal sum of the elements in each column represents the
directional spillover to other variables from variable 𝑗. The total spillover index, in the bottomright corner, is 19.56. The greatest contribution is from the benchmark crude of WTI, with
9.64%, followed by the crude of Dubai, with 9.59%. The least contribution is from the Brent
blend, with 0.33%. The results of the net spillover—that is, the difference between the
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directional spillover transmitted to others and received from others—is represented in the last
row of table 3.4. The results show that the crude of WTI is the net spillover receiver, while Brent
and Dubai are spillover transmitters.
To capture the time-varying return spillover across the benchmarks, I apply a dynamic
rolling index approach. The connectedness dynamics across the markets are measured using a
100-days rolling window and a 25-days ahead forecast horizon. I chose different time horizons
and the results were consistent with the selected time horizon. I use the same VAR model with
the same optimal length of 1. Figure 3.4 shows the overall spillover between the benchmarks of
WTI, Brent, and Dubai.

Figure 3.4. Overall spillover of log returns using rolling windows method.

It appears in figure 3.4 that the total spillover index is time-varying and ranges from 12.3% to
25.5%. Furthermore, the total spillover grows until the mid of 2016 with minimal fluctuations,
falls afterwards, picks up again in the mid of 2017, drops afterwards, and pick ups in early 2019.
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As previously mentioned, the trend of total spillover is increasing at the time of disturbances in
the international oil market.
Figure 3.5 displays the evolution of the pairwise net returns spillover index of each pair
of the variables WTI, Brent, and Dubai.

Figure 3.5. Net pairwise returns spillover.

Throughout the time frame in this study, the spillover between WTI and Brent is positive,
suggesting asymmetric volatility transmission, and WTI is dominating the spillover
transmissions. Additionally, the spillover between WTI and Dubai fluctuates between the
positive and negative. The spillover between Brent and Dubai is negative throughout the studied
time frame, suggesting asymmetric volatility transmission, and Dubai dominates the spillover
transmission. The time-varying causal relationship between the international crude oil
benchmarks determines the role that is played by the benchmark and may change overtime.
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In figure 3.6 I present the results of the net returns spillover for each crude oil
benchmark.

Figure 3.6. Dynamic total net connectedness for the log returns.

Figure 3.6 shows that the net spillover for the crude of WTI is positive, implying that the WTI
crude is a net transmitter. The net spillover of the Brent crude is negative, suggesting that Brent
is a net receiver. However, the crude oil of Dubai net spillover fluctuates between the positive
and negative, which implies that Dubai crude is a net transmitter until 2018 but becomes a net
receiver afterwards. This result is consistent with Al-yahyaee, Mensi, Sensoy, and Kong (2019).

3.5 Conclusion

Understanding the transmission mechanism of volatility in world crude oil markets is
important for different reasons, such as asset allocation and dynamic hedging. In this paper, I
study the time-varying volatility spillovers between three important crude oil benchmarks in the
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international crude oil market: WTI, Brent, and Dubai. In this analysis I use data from the
Bloomberg terminal for the time frame January 4, 2016 to November 14, 2019. I use the DCC
GARCH model to examine the contemporaneous correlations and the connectedness measures to
investigate the direction and characteristics for the spillover and interdependencies across the
markets. I provide empirical evidence that supports the claim of Adelman (1992) that the crude
oil market is one great pool during times of turbulence in the crude oil market. There is a
comovement among the oil prices of WTI, Brent, and Dubai, implying the existence of
integration, especially at times of disturbance in the oil market. The connectedness among these
benchmarks varies overtime. I find empirical evidence from the DCC GARCH and
connectedness measures that markets are more connected at times of disturbance, such as during
uncertainty about the global economy in early 2019 and the shale oil boom and the plunge of oil
prices in 2016. The contribution to the world of oil dynamics of each benchmarks differs among
the benchmarks. The benchmark of WTI and Dubai play an increasing role. I attribute that to the
importance of the emerging role of markets in East Asia.
One of the implications of our study is that the market participant should understand the
transmission of volatility in the world oil market. Understanding the transmission process will
help players in the crude oil market to better respond to conditions and manage their hedging
portfolios at times of disturbance in the international oil market.
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